

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 027130

P 291705Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2372

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0145

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 29, 1974
(SALT TWO-484)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCT. 29, 1974.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 29, 1974

ONE OF THE CHIEF REQUIREMENTS IN WORKING OUT THE NEW
AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR
THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 IS THAT THIS AGREEMENT BE EFFECTIVE
AND VIABLE. ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT
WHICH WOULD IMPOSE EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS AND WOULD REMAIN VIABLE FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF ITS
DURATION IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES, AS WELL
AS IN THE INTERESTS OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.

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THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT DEPEND ABOVE ALL ON CONSISTENT AND COMPLETE EMBODIMENT THEREIN OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES. THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING WAYS AND MEANS OF EMBODYING THIS PRINCIPLE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY SET FORTH BY THE USSR DELEGATION AND IS IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE U.S. SIDE.

PROCEEDING FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED PRINCIPLE, IT IS NECESSARY TO ANALYZE CAREFULLY EVERY AVAILABLE POSSIBILITY FOR ENHANCING THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT. FOR THIS PURPOSE, AT THE MEETING ON OCTOBER 25 THE USSR DELEGATION SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL THAT THE SIDES ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTING THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

TODAY WE WOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. SIDE TO THE NEED FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON A PROVISION TO PRECLUDE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THIRD STATES.

OF COURSE, WE DO NOT PROCEED FROM THE SUPPOSITION THAT EITHER OF THE CONTRACTING COUNTRIES WOULD NECESSARILY SEEK TO FIND ROUNDABOUT WAYS TO CIRCUMVENT THE UNDERSTANDING BEING WORKED OUT, AMONG OTHERS ALSO THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, PRECISE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD PROHIBIT THIS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, WOULD NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE JURIDICAL STRICTNESS OF THE DOCUMENT, WHICH IS ALSO OF NO SMALL IMPORTANCE, BUT WOULD ALSO BE A GENUINE MEASURE, BLOCKING STILL ANOTHER POSSIBLE CHANNEL FOR A BUILD-UP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

REACHING AGREEMENT ON A PROVISION TO PRECLUDE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THIRD STATES WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EMBODYING THEREIN THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF
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UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IT WOULD CLOSE OFF PATHS TOWARD OBTAINING BY INDIRECT MEANS UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES ON ONE SORT OR ANOTHER THROUGH THIRD STATES.

THE QUESTION OF PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES HAS BEEN RAISED AT PREVIOUS PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL. AS FAR BACK AS IN

HELSINKI AND VIENNA, THE USSR DELEGATION SUBMITTED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AIMED AT THAT GOAL. LATER, IN GENEVA, THE SOVIET SIDE SUBMITTED DETAILED PROPOSALS ON THIS SOCRE.

THE U.S. SIDE ALSO EXPRESSED CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS REGARD. THUS, AT THE APRIL 20, 1970 MEETING, THE U.S. DELEGATION, IN SETTING FORTH ITS GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, PROPOSED THAT "THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY."

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, IN GENEVA, TOO, THE U.S. SIDE HAS RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION IN TERMS OF ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IT SEEMS THAT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION AT PREVIOUS PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD SERVE AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR SEEKING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR THE TASK OF WORKING OUT A NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, A PROVISION BANNING THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT TO THIRD STATES WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.

OF COURSE, THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE OF A BILATERAL NATURE. NONETHELESS, CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE ARMAMENTS UNDER CONSIDERATION, IT IS INCONTESTABLE THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF POSITIVE RESULTS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES, THE INTERESTS OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.

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IF THE NEW AGREEMENT WERE TO PROVIDE FOR MEASURES LIMITING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME PROHIBITING THE TRANSFER OF THESE WEAPONS TO THIRD COUNTRIES, THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE FULLY ACCOMPLISHED AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT, IN ACTUAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL TERMS, WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

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P 291705Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2373

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0145

EXDIS/SALT

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TRANSFER BY ONE OF THE SIDES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT, TO ANY STATE (OR GROUP OF STATES), WOULD MEAN THAT IN SPITE OF THE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED, THE PROCESS OF BUILDING UP SUCH ARMAMENTS WOULD IN PRACTICE CONTINUE, WITH ALL THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM. THIS WOULD BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE GOALS OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WITH THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THAT TREATY TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT AN EARLY DATE AND TO NUCLEAR DISARMEMENT.

TRANSFER BY ONE OF THE SIDES TO ANY STATE (OR GROUP OF STATES) OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT, COULD LEAD TO REDUCING STRATEGIC STABILITY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND POTENTIALLY, PERHAPS, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES.

CONVERSELY, AN UNDERSTANDING ON NON-TRANSFER OF
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STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD BE IN

ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND WOULD HAVE A FAVORABLE IMPACT ON THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IT WOULD ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT MEASURE IN THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THIRD STATES.

THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH ABOVE ALSO APPLY TO THE TRANSFER TO THIRD COUNTRIES OF COMPONENTS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT, AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS THEREOF. ONE CANNOT BUT RECOGNIZE THAT IF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COMPONENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE TRANSFERRED TO A THIRD STATE, THAT STATE WOULD GAIN ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR A BUILD-UP OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE SAME NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES THAT WERE DISCUSSED ABOVE.

THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD COUNTRIES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT APPLIES EQUALLY TO QUANTITATIVE AS WELL AS QUALITATIVE ASPECTS. INDEED, IF ANY STATE WERE ABLE TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE CAPABILITIES OF ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, FOR EXAMPLE, BY ACQUIRING FROM ONE OF THE SIDES MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES FOR STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES, OR THEIR COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS, SUCH ACTIONS COULD NOT BUT AFFECT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, AND IN A MOST SUBSTANTIAL MANNER AT THAT. IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A SITUATION WOULD AFFECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND WOULD WEAKEN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC ARMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN WORKING OUT THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS, THE SIDES, PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES OF ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY, FOUND AN APPROPRIATE, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION. AS YOU KNOW, ITS WORDING

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IS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IX OF THE TREATY AND IN THE CORRESPONDING AGREED STATEMENT.

THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER IS ALL THE MORE LEGITIMATE IN CONNECTION WITH WORKING OUT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AFTER ALL, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE KIND OF WEAPONS, WHOSE BUILD-UP IN THIRD COUNTRIES COULD TO A MUCH GREATER DEGREE AFFECT STRATEGIC STABILITY, WITH ALL THE

ENSUING NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH PERHAPS ARE EVEN DIFFICULT TO FORECAST, IN TERMS OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AS A WHOLE. WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE SPREAD OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS NEITHER IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES, NOR IN THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. AS FOR THE PATHS OF SUCH A SPREAD, THEY COULD BE UNEXPECTED, IF A BROADER HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE MATTER IS TAKEN. NOW, WHEN THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT AND ITS POSSIBLE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE ARE UNDER DISCUSSION, THE INTERESTS OF WORKING OUT AN EFFECTIVE AND VIABLE AGREEMENT DEMAND CONSIDERATION AND APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES, AND OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES IN PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROVISION.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSE A PROVISION PRECLUDING CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THIRD STATES BE NEGOTIATED. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE TRANSFER TO THIRD STATES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT, THEIR COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS AND BLUEPRINTS SPECIALLY WORKED OUT FOR THESE ARMAMENTS, MUST ALSO BE PROHIBITED.

UNQUOTE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MEETING REPORTS, SALT TWO 484
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974SALTT00145
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: DG ALTERD
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740308-0771
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741010/aaaaahrz.tel
Line Count: 307
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <23 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 29, 1974 (SALT TWO-484)
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005